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Extending the Scope of the Antiquities Act
Brent J. Hartman1
INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Antiquities Act 2 (the Act) in 1906,
Congress granted the president the power to create national
monuments.3 The Antiquities Act authorizes the president to create
national monuments to protect historic or scientific landmarks,
structures, or objects.4 The Act also allows the president to reserve
the land necessary to protect these objects.5
Containing few
limitations or guidelines, the Act provides the president with broad
powers to add land to the public domain.6 Since the Act's passage,
nearly every president has utilized the power to achieve preservation
or conservation objectives.7 The Act has been used to create 126
national monuments, 8 including the Grand Canyon, Devils Tower,
the Badlands, and Death Valley. 9
In many cases, national

I.
Regulatory Project Manager, Ohio Aerospace Institute, Cleveland,
Ohio; J.D., University of Toledo College of Law (2010); B.A., Oakland University
(2006). First, I would like to acknowledge Professor Kenneth Kilbert, Associate
Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law, for his comments and
suggestions during the formation of the topic and on early drafts. I also greatly
appreciate the comments and suggestions of the Public Land & Resources Law
Review staff during the preparation of the article for publication. Finally, I would
like to thank my wife, Orysia, for listening to me think out loud throughout the
process.
2.
16 U.S.C. § 431 (2006).
3.
See id
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
See id
7.
Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of
1906, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 473, 488-489 (2003).
8.
Jeff Brax, Zoning the Oceans: Using the NationalMarine Sanctuaries
Act and the Antiquities Act to Establish Marine Protection Areas and Marine
Reserves in America, 29 Ecol. L.Q. 71, 124 (2002) (finding 123 monuments in
2002); Joseph Briggett, An Ocean of Executive Authority: Courts Should Limit the
President's Antiquities Act Power to Designate Monuments in the Outer
Continental Shelf 22 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 403, 407 (2009) (finding that President
George W. Bush added three monuments).
9.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 490-495.
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monuments become, or are integrated into, national parks.' 0 In fact,
more than half of the National Park System consists of national
monuments.'' Usage of the Act is often unpopular or politically
controversial, yet judicial and legislative actions have accomplished
little to limit the scope of the Act.12 Although the Act is not without
limitations, the outer bounds of its powers remain unknown.1 3
In the face of these unknowns, this article suggests several
strategies a president may use to expand the executive's conservation
powers under the Antiquities Act. Section I introduces the history of
the Antiquities Act, providing a basis of understanding past and
future use of the Act. Demonstrating the resiliency of the Act,
Section II discusses the various judicial and legislative challenges
faced by the Antiquities Act. Finally, Section III examines the future
of the Antiquities Act and proposes several methods for utilizing the
Act's minimal language in order to provide greater protection to
America's historic and scientific objects, landmarks, and structures.
Specifically, the scope of the Act can be expanded in two ways: 1)
recognizing that the Act provides two separate powers, the
declaration power and the reservation power; and 2) adopting a broad
definition of the term "controlled lands." This article proposes two
methods for utilizing the expanded scope: a sliding scale test to
determine the level of control necessary to declare a monument and a
negotiate-proclaim strategy to achieve acquiescence of the landowner
where the monument is located. By teaming a broad reading of the
Act with strategic utilization, a president can greatly expand the

The Antiquities Act: A Century of American Archaeology, Historic
10.
Preservation, and Nature Conservation 58 (David Harmon et al. eds., U. Ariz.
Press 2006) [hereinafter The Antiquities Act]. The difference between a national
park and national monument is discussed infra pt. I.C.
11.
Richard West Sellars, A Very Large Array: Early Federal Historic
Preservation - The Antiquities Act, Mesa Verde, and the National Park Service
Act, 47 Nat. Resources J. 267, 282 (2007). Some national monuments are
recognized worldwide as World Heritage sites. Id.
12. Infra pt.II.
13.
Eric C. Rusnak, The Straw that Broke the Camel's Back? Grand
Staircase-EscalanteNational Monument Antiquates the Antiquities Act, 64 Ohio St.
L.J. 669, 681 (2003).
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executive branch's role in the conservation and protection of
America's national treasures.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
To provide a better understanding of the broad scope of the
Antiquities Act, this section provides an introduction to the Act by
examining its creation, a discussion comparing national parks and
national monuments, and presidential usage of the Act. The history
of the Antiquities Act provides the foundation necessary to explore
the challenges faced by the Act and to determine its future scope.
A. The Creationof the Antiquities Act
The Antiquities Act and its history are important in the
analysis of its potential scope. To understand the history of the
Antiquities Act, it is best to start with a display of the Act in its final
form, followed by the history of its creation. The plain language of
the Act states:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his
discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic
landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and
other objects of historic or scientific interest that are
situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States to be national
monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels
of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be
confined to the smallest area compatible with the
proper care and management of the objects to be
protected. When such objects are situated upon a tract
covered by a bona fide unperfected claim or held in
private ownership, the tract, or so much thereof as
may be necessary for the proper care and management
of the object, may be relinquished to the Government,
and the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to
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accept the relinquishment of such tracts in behalf of
the Government of the United States.14
Although brief, the Act provides three necessary criteria for
declarations and reservations: the monument must be historic or
scientific, situated on lands owned or controlled by the government,
and confined to smallest area compatible for proper management.
Notably, the Act does not include any definitions for the criteria.'6
Despite its simplicity, the Act was years in the making, not simply a
whim of Congress.17
The Antiquities Act resulted from a change in federal land
management policy' 8 and the efforts of Representative John F. Lacey
(Lacey) and Edgar Lee Hewett (Hewett) with the backing of the
General Land Office (GLO). 19 Through most of the nineteenth
century, the United States followed a policy of disposition in regard
to public land.20 The goal of the disposition period was to develop the
West.21 To achieve this goal, the GLO was created to oversee the
disposal of public land.22 Further exemplifying the desire to settle
the West through the disposal of public land, The Homestead Act 23
and Mining Act of 187224 were passed to encourage western
development.25 An increasing interest in Native American sites,
frequently subject to vandalism and rampant profiteering, and the
realization that the western frontier was finite ,26 marked a shift in the
14.
16 U.S.C. § 431.
Id.
15.
16. Id. This article suggests creating a definition section for the Act.
Infra pt. 11.D.
17.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 220.
18.
Sellars, supra n. 11, at 272.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 479.
19.
20.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 220.
21.
James Rasband, James Salzman & Mark Squillace, Natural
Resources Law and Policy 119 (West 2004).
22.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 220.
23. 43 U.S.C. U 161-164 (repealed 1976); 43 U.S.C. 6 291 (repealed
1976).

24.

30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (2006).

25.

Sellars, supra n. 11, at 272.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 22-27, 267-268.

26.
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disposition policy toward retention of federal land for preservation
and conservation.27 The GLO had only one weapon to combat the
vandalism and profiteering of Native American sites: the power of
withdrawal.228 But the power of withdrawal could only provide
temporary protection.29 Failing to achieve protection of these sites
through federal land withdrawals, the GLO found an ally in
Congress, Lacey, and a dedicated proponent of archaeology, Hewett,
to champion the cause. 30
Lacey was an eight-term Republican representative from
Iowa.31 Lacey's personal connection with conservation issues is
unknown, other than Lacey's dedication to the committee process
and his placement on the House Committee on Public Lands early in
his congressional career. 32 However, more is known about Hewett's
motives in crafting the Act. 33
Hewett, deeply involved in
archaeology and a resident of New Mexico, believed the government
should act as a steward for archaeological resources located on
federal land.34 Reconciling the problem of dueling bills between the
government and scientific community, Hewett drafted a noncontroversial bill with careful wording to appease both sides,
satisfying the government's desire for protection and the scientific
community's desire for access. 35 Hewett relayed the bill to Lacey,
whom he had worked with in the past on conservation issues.3 6
Within no time, the Act was signed by President Theodore
Roosevelt.37 While Lacey's connection to conservation was not as
developed as Hewett's, throughout his career, Lacey backed a variety
of bills preserving public lands.3 8 Prior to the Act itself, Lacey
27.
Sellars, supra n. 11, at 274; Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 674; The
Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 22-27.
28.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 27.
29.
Id.
30.
Sellars, supra n. 11, at 279-282; The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at
35-47.
31.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 51, 56.
32.
Id. at 51-55.
33.
Id. at 35-47, 270.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 270.
36.
Id. at 36.
37. Id. at 31.
38.
Squillace, supran. 7, at 479.
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introduced bills with a much larger scope than the Antiquities Act. 39
For example, an early Lacey bill incorporated elements similar to
those ultimately passed a decade later in the National Park Service
Act.40 The expansive language of these early acts led to resistance in
Congress, particularly from western states accustomed to the
government facilitating development. 4 1 Thus, the potential size of
monuments and permanent federal control over these large tracts of
land became a rallying point for those opposing Lacey's bills. 42
Although early versions of the Act included language specifically
limiting monument size, the Act places no acreage limits on
monuments.4 3 Instead, the Antiquities Act states that monuments
must only "be confined to the smallest area compatible with the
proper care and management of the objects to be protected." 44
Leading up to the passage of the Act, Lacey addressed the concerns
of his western colleagues, perhaps easing their minds.4 5 Lacey stated
the purpose of the legislation was to protect objects, not large tracts
of land.46 After prior failed attempts, perhaps Lacey simply wanted
support for his bill, taking steps necessary to ensure its enactment. 47
Regardless of Lacey's motive, the Antiquities Act ultimately
succeeded and continues to play a major role in public land
management. 48 Despite the widespread concern over the bills Lacey
introduced, there is sparse legislative history of the Antiquities Act to
examine. Of the history that exists, some of it supports a broad
reading and some of it supports a narrow reading of the Act's key
language. A report before the 59th House of Representatives states
that the purpose of the Act is to protect relics by reservation of small
tracts of land and that the Act pertains to relics found on public and
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Sellars, supra n. 11, at 281-282.
Id.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 481.
Sellars, supra n. 11, at 295.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 483.
16 U.S.C. § 431.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 272; Sellars, supra n. 11, at 295-

46.
47.

Sellars, supra n. 11, at 295-296.
Id.

48.

Infra pt. I.C.

296.
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private land. 49 Astoundingly, the Act is frequently used for the exact
opposite purpose of the report - the preservation of large tracts of
public land.so
Similarly, an examination of the Senate's Committee on
Public Lands' report and the floor debate prior to passage suggests
the Senate shared the House's view of the Act.5 1 During the brief
floor debate,5 2 opponents voiced concerns that the Act would grant
the federal government permanent control over large tracts of land. 53
As noted above, Lacey addressed the concerns of his western
colleagues by stating that the Antiquities Act aimed to protect objects
on small tracts of land.5 4 However, based on prior attempts to pass
similar bills and the language of the final act, Lacey, Hewett, and
their allies in the GLO probably intended the subsequent sweeping
55
usage.
A comparison of failed early versions of the Act to the
successful Act itself also provides some insight as to congressional
intent. The early bills differ from the Act in two distinct ways size limits and scope. First, despite pressing concern over the issue,
the Act contains no acreage limits. 56 Second, an organization that
Hewett was active in,57 the American Anthropological Association,
managed to include the word "scientific" in the Act's descriptors of
potentially protected objects.
These two differences between the
49.
Steven Platzman, Objects of Controversy: The Native American Right
to Repatriation,41 Am. U. L. Rev. 517, 537 n. 114 (1992) (citing H.R. Rpt. No.
2224, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1906)).
50. President Theodore Roosevelt started the trend with his 18
monuments totaling more than 1.2 million acres. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10,
at 74. President Clinton created 22 monuments, covering six million acres. Id. at
125 n. 1. President George W. Bush created the largest national monument.
Briggett, supra n. 8, at 406.
51.
Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 675-676.
52.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 484 (noting the brief floor debate over the
Act).
53.
Id. at 484 n. 59.
54.
Sellars, supra n. 11, at 295-296.
55.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 477; The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 272.
By handing the power over to President Theodore Roosevelt, Congress should have
realized the form the Act would take. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 272.
56.
Id. at 483.
57.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 39.
58.
Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 674-675.
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failed early bills and the eventual Antiquities Act contributed greatly
to the increased scope of the Act, and the acceptance of a more
ambiguous act suggests Congress intended a broad scope.
While one could resolve many of the Act's ambiguities using
the legislative history and Lacey's statements about the Act, the Act
has largely been used to achieve the opposite of what the legislative
history suggests: the Act is not limited to small tracts of land,
singular objects, or temporary federal control. 59
The Act's
opponents' concerns have proven true; the plain language of the Act
provides the president with expansive power.60
B. What is a Monument?
Predating the Antiquities Act's introduction of the term
"national monument" by more than three decades, Congress
introduced the term "national park" with the designation of
Yellowstone National Park in 1872.61 An examination of these terms
helps clarify the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches in federal land management. While there may be some
shared characteristics between the terms, "national parks" and
"national monuments" are not synonymous terms. First, monuments
and parks are created by different branches of government; Congress
creates national parks, and presidents create national monuments. 62
However, Congress has the authority to alter or repeal national
monuments.63 While sharing a general purpose of conservation and
preservation of federal land,6 4 the statutory purposes for creating

59. President Theodore Roosevelt's first proclamation, Devils Tower,
was neither small, a single object, nor temporary.
60.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 72.
61.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 483, 487.
62.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f (2006) (The Park Service Organic Act); 16 U.S.C.
§ 431 (2006) (The Antiquities Act).
63.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 121-122. Generally, Congress
improves upon national monument designations. Id. at 122.
64.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 488-489.
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parks and monuments also differ. 65
The proclamation and
reservation of monuments protects historic, prehistoric, or scientific
sites or objects. 66 Parks, on the other hand, preserve character and
scenery. 67 Importantly, while the National Park Service manages
parks, various agencies may manage monuments. This leads to one
final distinction between parks and monuments: permitted uses.68
Monuments within the national park system are subject to the same
use limitations as national parks. 9 For monuments outside the park
system, the permitted uses vary depending on the supervising
agency.70 Permitted uses also may vary based on proclamation
71
72
objectives,7 but all national monuments prohibit mining leases.
Thus, although parks and monuments may share some similar
characteristics, the two classifications are distinct.
C. PresidentialUsage of the Antiquities Act
Usage of the Antiquities Act spans the political and historical
spectrum, solidifying its presence as a popular executive power.
Within months of the passage of the Antiquities Act, President
Theodore Roosevelt created the first national monument, Devils
Tower National Monument.7 3 President Roosevelt went on to create
additional monuments totaling 1.2 million acres. 74 Nearly every
subsequent president followed his lead, though few would top

65.
Roberto Iraola, Proclamations,National Monuments, and the Scope
ofJudicial Review under the Antiquities Act of 1906, 29 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. &
Policy Rev. 159, 167-168 (2004).
66.
16 U.S.C. § 431.
67.
Iraola, supra n. 65, at 167. Because these purposes overlap in many
cases, national monuments often become integrated into national parks. Squillace,
supra n. 7, at 488-489.
68.
Squillace, supran. 7, at 516.
69. Id.
70. Id (stating that the Bureau of Land Management and Forest Service
allow for the broadest use of national monuments).
71.
Id. at 516-519 (describing national monuments as "snowflakes").
72. Id. at 516.
73.
Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 677.
74.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 74.
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Roosevelt's acreage.7 5 Only Presidents Nixon, Reagan and H. W.
Bush failed to create at least one monument under the Antiquities
Act.76 Following the void of activity by his two immediate
predecessors, President Clinton resumed the tradition of creating
national monuments,77 22 million acres in all,78 including the first
oceanic national monument. 79 President George W. Bush, although
not generally known for his strong environmental record,80 created
the largest national monument, the Papahanaumokuakea National
Monument, at 140,000 square miles.8 Despite the strong tradition of
the Act as a preservation and conservation tool, the broad power
associated with the Antiquities Act has been the subject of
considerable controversy and has consistently faced challenges.
II. CHALLENGES TO THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
Throughout its history, the Antiquities Act has faced
numerous challengers offering a variety of critiques.82 Many of the
critiques resulted in judicial and legislative challenges, and for the
most part the Act has withstood these challenges. This section
describes the challenges by highlighting the judicial and legislative
actions opposing the Antiquities Act.
A. JudicialAction
As with other controversial legislation, opponents of the
Antiquities Act use the courtroom as a battleground. Although it has
faced a variety of legal challenges, the Act has withstood them all.
Reviewing these unsuccessful challenges demonstrates the vast scope
75.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 490-514 (highlighting the various eras of the
Antiquities Act).
76. Id. at 489.
77. Briggett, supra n. 8, at 406.
78.
The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 125 n. 1.
79. Id.
80. See Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental
Policy under Bush II, 14 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum 363 (2004).
81.
Briggett, supra n. 8, at 406.
82.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 475.
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of the Antiquities Act. But to further understand the Act's success in
court, the section below begins with a discussion of the reviewability
of presidential statutory authority and then explores the results of the
challenges to the Act.
1. The Reviewability ofPresidentialStatutory Authority
Before a court can hear the merits of a claim, opponents must
clear the initial hurdle of reviewability.
Generally, statutory
authority delegating discretion to the president is not subject to
judicial review. 83 However, the Antiquities Act does not provide the
president with absolute discretion in creating national monuments. 84
In examining claims brought by opponents to proclamations made
under the Antiquities Act, courts remain "severely limited" in
reviewing the proclamation.8 5 At a minimum, the president has
discretion in the facts and findings included within the
proclamation. 86 This discretion practically defeats all challenges to
the Antiquities Act.87
Courts must accept the president's
proclamation that the objects are scientific or historic and that the
federally retained area is the smallest compatible to protect the
objects.88

By simply including the "scientific or historic" and

"smallest compatible" language in the proclamation, the president
leaves the court virtually powerless to review his findings.89
Although commentators argue against such a strict reviewability bar

83.
Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994). Although the president
is not an agency for the purposes of the APA, id. at 476, judicial review of agency
action is also limited if "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006).
84.
See 16 U.S.C. § 431.
85.
Tulare Co. v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d 18, 24 (D.D.C. 2001).
86.
Id at 25 (citing Cappaert v. U.S., 426 U.S. 128 (1976) and Cameron

v. U.S., 252 U.S. 450 (1920)).
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
See id.

164

PUBLIC LAND& RESOURCESLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 32

of presidential decisions, 90 the presidential power under the
Antiquities Act remains largely insulated from judicial tampering. 9 1
In addition to the facts and findings reviewability bar,
potential lawsuits challenging the Antiquities Act may face additional
hurdles. The Antiquities Act does not provide definitions to the few
limitations it does provide,92 leaving many statutory terms open to
vast interpretation within the proclamations. Thus, the president's
broad construction of the terms such as "historic or scientific," and
"smallest area compatible with the proper care and management" 93
have been upheld.94 If a challenge properly raises the question of
whether or not the president interpreted the term correctly, courts will
likely defer to the president's interpretation, assuming the
interpretation is reasonable.
In the landmark case Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court ruled that an
executive agency's statutory interpretation is granted deference if the
statute is "silent or ambiguous" and the agency's interpretation is
reasonable and permissible. 9 5 The application of Chevron to
presidential interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms remains an
unsettled question.96 Many commentators argue that the president
should receive Chevron deference in statutory interpretation,97
although some would limit the application of Chevron to when
Congress directly grants the power to the president. 98
90. Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President's Statutory
Powers, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1171, 1213 (2009).
91.
Courts can review discretion in accordance with the standard, but not
determinations and findings of fact. Tulare, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
92. Infra pt. III.D (discussing an amendment to include a definition
section for the Act).
93.
16 U.S.C. § 431.
94.
Tulare, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
95. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-843 (1984).
96. See Kevin M. Stack, The President'sStatutory Powers to Administer
the Laws, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 263, 308-310 (2006) [hereinafter Stack,
Administer].
97. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to
Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L.J. 2580, 2603-2604 (2006).
98. See Stack, Administer, supra n. 96, at 309.
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The application of Chevron to presidential statutory authority
would certainly bolster presidential power under the Antiquities Act.
By defining the ambiguous terms in the Antiquities Act, the president
could increase the scope of an act that already provides sweeping
power to conserve or preserve land and objects. 99 The ability to
challenge proclamations is already "severely limited,"' 00 but if courts
apply Chevron deference to presidential interpretation of ambiguous
statutes, the court door would be all but shut to challengers.' 0 The
issue of reviewability and deference coupled with the failed
challenges, detailed below,102 renders any resort to the judiciary an
ineffective strategy to challenge the Antiquities Act. 0 3
2. PropertyClause andNon-Delegation Doctrine
One common argument against the Antiquities Act is that it
violates the Property Clause of the Constitution,' 04 which states that
"[t]he Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." 0 5 The Property Clause grants
Congress this authority "without limitations."l06
The authority
extends beyond public land, to the extent necessary to protect the
designated purpose of public land.10 7 For example, as discussed
earlier, Congress can use the power to create national parks. 0 8
Opponents of the Antiquities Act contend that the Property
Clause grants all power over federal land to Congress.109 Courts,
99.
See Infra pt. 1II.B.2.
100. Tulare, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
101. Chevron requires a court to determine: 1) Whether a statute is
ambiguous (if it is not ambiguous, than the court's analysis ends there); and 2) If it
is ambiguous, whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843.
102. Infra pt. II.A.2.
103. Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 692.
104. Mt. Sts. Leg. Found v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Utah Assn. of Cos. v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176-1177 (D. Utah 2004).

105.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

106.
107.
108.
109.

U.S. v. City and Co. of San Francisco,310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940).
Minn. v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981).
Supra pt. I.B.
Mt. Sts., 306 F.3d at 1134.
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however, will uphold congressional delegation of such authority if it
is properly delegated under the Property Clause.o10 Opponents,
therefore, argue delegation of Property Clause power through the
Antiquities Act violates the Non-Delegation Doctrine."' The NonDelegation Doctrine bars Congress from unconstitutionally
delegating its legislative authority to another branch of
government.112 To avoid violating the Non-Delegation Doctrine,
Congress must provide the recipient of the authority with an
intelligible principle the recipient must conform to when exercising
the delegated legislative power. 1 3 Because Congress provided an
intelligible principle in the Antiquities Act, the Act does not violate
the Non-Delegation Doctrine. 1 14 Thus, future challenges brought
under the Property Clause and Non-Delegation Doctrine will
continue to be unsuccessful.1 15
3. Public Process
The Antiquities Act has also been criticized for lack of public
process, including the Antiquities Act's ability to sidestep the
110. Utah Assn., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-1191.
111. Mt. Sts.,306F.3dat 1133.
112. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). The
Constitution grants all legislative authority to Congress. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 1.
Therefore, a congressional delegation of the power is only proper if Congress
includes an intelligible principle with which the authority must comply. Whitman,
531 U.S. at 472. "[A]lmost never [feeling] qualified to second-guess Congress,"
the Supreme Court has struck down only two statutes for violating the standard. Id.
at 474.
113. Whitman, 531 U.S. at472.
114. Mt. Sts., 306 F.3d at 1137. The court stated the assertion without
completely explaining what the principles are. In Tulare Co. v. Bush, 306 F.3d
1138, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2002), the court affirmed the intelligible principle in the Act
after rejecting challenges related to the requirement that the object be of "historic
or scientific interest" and the land reservation be "confined to the smallest area
compatible with proper care and management."
115. While the Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the issue, only
two statutes have been struck for violating the standard. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court declined to review either Mountain States, Mt. Sts.
Leg. Found. v. Bush, 540 U.S. 812 (2003), or Tulare County, Tulare Co. v. Bush,
540 U.S. 813 (2003).
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National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).116 NEPA requires
federal agencies to consider environmental policy when proposing
actions that may affect the human environment.l17 The Antiquities
Act requires no public input such as notice and comment, public
hearings, or Environmental Impact Statements under NEPA.
Presidential proclamations under the Act evade these requirements
largely due to the fact that the President is not an agency,' 9 both for
the purposes of NEPA1 20 and the Administrative Procedure Act.121
Lack of judicial review further insulates the presidential action from
the scorn of those disapproving of the proclamation. 122 Nevertheless,
there are opposing views on whether the lack of public process is a
positive or negative characteristic of the Antiquities Act.123
One criticism of the lack of public process is that the
Antiquities Act works against democratic principles.124 Presidents,
however, are not isolated from the political process and remain
accountable for political decisions through the election process.125
Furthermore, it would be an enormous burden on Congress to
manage all public land. 12 6 Not surprisingly, Congress has delegated
management authority of federal land to agencies through legislation
such as the Federal Land Policy Management Act and the National
The Antiquities Act furthers this
Forest Management Act.127
efficiency by classifying land and providing guidelines for its
management.128
116.

Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 692; Briggett, supra n. 8, at 404.

117. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
118. See 16 U.S.C. § 431; Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 692.
119. Alaska v. Carter,462 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (D. Alaska 1978).
120. Id.

121. Franklinv. Mass., 505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992).
122. Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, The Details, and the Dawn of the 21st
Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 941, 1044

(2000).
123. Id. at 1044-1047.
124. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 476.
125. Zellmer, supra n. 122, at 1047; But see Briggett, supra n. 8, at 403404 (exploring a controversial designation by President George W. Bush in the
final month of his presidency).
126. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 476.
127. Id.;Infrapt. I1.B.L.
128. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 476; 16 U.S.C. § 431.
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Delegated authority, however, does not preclude Congress
from intervening into the issue; the broad Property Clause authority
allows Congress to reverse or expand national monument
designations. 129 The Antiquities Act also allows the president to
avoid procedural delays, which could be exacerbated by political or
business forces.' 3 0 Because the delays may place fragile resources at
risk, the precautionary principle is embodied in the Act, allowing
preservation of the monument until Congress decides otherwise.131
Delay due to significant public process may cause harm to these
important sites and objects. 132
On the other hand, additional public process could improve
monument designation under the Act. Frequent criticism of the lack
of public participation stems from local disapproval of land
classification.' 3 3 Monument proclamations are frequently unpopular
with the local community.1 34 Local input prior to the decisionmaking process could ease resistance and provide valuable
knowledge about the local community's issues and needs.' 3 5 Local
input could also allow the president to fully understand the
consequences of potential action,136 appeasing, instead of enraging,
the local community.' 37 President Clinton made an effort to seek
public input before his monument proclamations.1 38 Absent an
129. Zellmer, supra n. 122, at 1047. Congress frequently improves upon
monument designations, instead of overturning them. The Antiquities Act, supra n.
10, at 122.
130. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 577-578.
131. Id. at 580.
132. Zellmer, supra n. 122, at 1046.
133. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 137-38.
134. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 473.
135. Zellmer, supra n. 122, at 1046.
136. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 571. The passage of time generally
extinguishes the opposition. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 108.
137. Bruce Babbitt, President Clinton's Interior Secretary, engaged in local
input prior to suggesting monuments, often leading to legislative action to protect
the lands, where local support for protection was strong. The Antiquities Act, supra
n. 10, at 112.
138. Zellmer, supra n. 122, at 1044; Squillace, supra n. 7, at 539-540.
President Clinton's Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbit, implemented a "no
surprises" policy. Id. at 539. The process required three steps: 1) visiting areas
under contemplation for monumental status; 2) meeting with interested local

2011]1

THE ANTIQUITIES ACT

169

emergency, future presidents should follow Clinton's lead and seek
public input. Public input may eliminate controversy, thus halting
future judicial action.
B. Legislative Action
Although legal challenges to Antiquities Act proclamations
have not succeeded, these failures direct opponents of the Antiquities
Act to seek change through the legislative process. Courts have
stated that Congress holds the power to resolve conflicts over the
Antiquities Act.1 39 Congress has heeded the call to action but has
accomplished very little.140 Congress has introduced bills to
specifically limit or repeal the Antiquities Act, but Congress has
rarely succeeded.141 Congressional attempts to limit the Act have
generally followed controversial designations, such as President F. D.
Roosevelt's Jackson Hole monument and President Carter's Alaska
monuments.142 Congress, however, has successfully passed other
legislation that shares characteristics with the Antiquities Act.143
Opponents of the Antiquities Act suggest that these subsequent
statutes supplant the Act, although not explicitly.' 44 Specifically,
opponents point to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,145
the Archaeological Resource Protection Act,146 and the National
Marine Sanctuaries Act.14 7 As described below,148 despite the
similarities in these acts, the authority provided to the president by
the Antiquities Act remains distinguishable from these acts and has
not been replaced.

officials and citizens; and 3) allowing local congressional representatives to obtain
protection of the area before invoking the Act. Id. at 539-540.
139. See Wyo. v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (D. Wyo. 1945).
140. Infra pt. II.B.4.
141. Id.
142. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 81, 93.
143. Infra pt. II.B.1-3.
144. Michael J. Davidson, Native American CulturalProtection Issues in
Government Contracts,28 Pub. Contract L.J. 189, 192 (1999).
145. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787 (2006).
146. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2006).
147. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445 (2006).
148. Infra pt. 11.B.1-4.
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1. FederalLand Policy and ManagementAct
Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management
Actl 4 9 (FLPMA) in 1976 to serve as the primary statute for public
land management.15 0 The enactment of FLPMA provided federal
agencies with streamlined management guidance to replace the
existing piecemeal approach.15' As recommended by the Public
Land Law Review Commission, FLPMA repealed all executive
withdrawal and reservation power with one exception: the Antiquities
Act. 152 Although Congress left the Antiquities Act power untouched,
commentators debate whether FLPMA should supplant Antiquities
Act authority.153
Debate over the relationship between FLPMA and the
Antiquities Act centers around two arguments: the emergency
protection debate and the spotlight debate.154 In the emergency
protection debate, Antiquities Act proponents argue that the FLPMA
process hinders the ability of the president to preserve resources at
risk of being lost forever' 5 5 and that FLPMA withdrawals lack
permanence.156
FLPMA proponents consider the emergency
149. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787.
150. Roger Flynn, Daybreak on the Land: The Coming Age of the Federal
Land Policy and ManagementAct of 1976, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 8 15, 816 (2005).
151. Id. at 817.
152. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 568-569.
153. Compare id. at 581-582 with James R. Rasband, The Future of the
Antiquities Act, 21 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 619, 630-632 (2001) [hereinafter
Rasband, Future].
154. Rasband, Future,supra n. 153, at 630-631.
155. Under FLPMA, there are three categories of withdrawals: greater than
5,000 acres, less than 5,000 acres, and emergency. 43 U.S.C. § 1714. Withdrawals
greater than 5,000 acres require elaborate reports and public hearings, and the
withdrawal may not last for more than twenty years. Id. at § 1714(c), (i).
Withdrawals less than 5,000 acres also require a public hearing but require fewer
reports and the length of the withdrawal is within the discretion of the Secretary of
the Interior. See Id. at. § 1714(d), (i). Emergency withdrawals are effective
immediately but only last up to three years. Id. at § 1714(e). However, emergency
withdrawals do not require a public hearing. Id. at § 1714(i). Instead, FLPMA
subjects the emergency withdrawal to some of the same reporting requirements as
the greater than 5,000 acre withdrawals. Id. at. § 1714(e).
156. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 581-582.
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protection argument a red herring because the Antiquities Act has
Furthermore, FLPMA
never been used in an emergency.' 5 7
proponents counter that FLPMA allows emergency withdrawal
without significant procedure,' 58 thereby providing a more
democratic process through the post-withdrawal procedures. 59In
return for the procedural advantages offered by FLPMA, process and
procedure invite political maneuvering potentially placing the public
interest at risk.'6 0
In the spotlight debate, Antiquities Act proponents argue that
the Act draws attention to lands or objects that Congress might
otherwise ignorel61 or fail to protect adequately.162 Antiquities Act
proponents argue further that lands withdrawn under FLPMA do not
enjoy the same importance as those with a "national monument"
designation.163 FLPMA proponents, however, claim the argument is
no longer relevant because the Antiquities Act withdrawals taken to
bypass an unsupportive Congress were accomplished prior to the
enactment of FLPMA. 164
While both sides make strong arguments, the Antiquities Act
has continued to thrive since the 1976 passage of FLPMA. 165
Presidents continue to use the Antiquities Act, and Congress has not
yet explicitly replaced the Act.' 66 Therefore, FLPMA remains an
alternative, not a replacement, to the Act.
2. ArchaeologicalResource ProtectionAct
In 1979, Congress enacted the Archaeological Resource
Protection Actl67 (ARPA), responding to the Antiquities Act's
157. Rasband, Future, supra n. 153, at 631.
158. FLPMA procedures must still be followed but not until after the
emergency withdrawal. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e).
159. Rasband, Future, supra n. 153, at 631.
160. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 578.
161. Id. at 540.
162. Rasband, Future, supra n. 153, at 630.
163. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 581-582.
164. Rasband, Future, supra n. 153, at 630-631.
165. While President Reagan and President H.W. Bush did not use the Act,
all other presidents since 1976 have utilized the Act. Supra pt. I.C.
166. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 225.
167. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm.
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perceived shortcomings.168 ARPA declares that its goals are to
secure archaeological sources located on public and Indian land and
to increase communication and cooperation between governmental
entities, private collectors, and the archaeological community.1 69
While ARPA supplements the Antiquities Act, ARPA lacks too many
important characteristics to consider it a proper substitute.
First, ARPA protection is limited to archaeological resources
and sites, 170 while the scope of the Antiquities Act extends beyond
archaeological objects.171 Second, ARPA governs resources on
public and Indian lands,172 but the Antiquities Act asserts control
over controlled lands in addition to public lands.17 3 For these
reasons, ARPA supplements the Antiquities Act, but ARPA does not
alter any of the president's withdrawal power under the Antiquities
Act. The Antiquities Act provides greater latitude than ARPA by
protecting additional scientific and historic objectsl 74 and by
potentially extending beyond public lands.' 7 5
3. NationalMarine SanctuariesAct
By title alone, the National Marine Sanctuaries Act 76
(NMSA) reveals itself as an insufficient alternative to the Antiquities
Act; NMSA does not protect inland resources. Unlike FLPMA and
ARPA, Congress enacted NMSA to function as a companion to the
168. Davidson, supra n. 144, at 192. Davidson's article highlights
additional, more specific acts regarding the protection of Native American
resources. Id. at 195-199.
169. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b).
170. Id.
171. Tulare, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 24; 16 U.S.C. § 431 (protecting "historic
landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or
scientific interest").
172. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b).
173. 16 U.S.C. § 431; "controlled lands" are discussed later in this article.
Infra pt. I11.B.2.
174. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (stating ARPA applies to archaeological sites
and resources); 16 U.S.C. § 431 (stating the Act applies to "objects of historic or
scientific interest").
175. Infra pt. I1I.B.2.
176. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445.
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ability to reserve federal land.177 As the scope of the Antiquities Act
extended seaward,178 commentators began to debate which act
provides more capable means for marine preservation, the Antiquities

Act or NMSA.17 9
The Antiquities Act provides two advantages over NMSA.
First, as noted above,s Antiquities Act proclamations avoid the
requirements of NEPA and other public processes.181 Second, the
threat of proclamation, alone, under the Antiquities Act breaks the
political gridlock of the collaborative process required under
NMSA.1 82 Therefore, the Antiquities Act can either bypass the
NMSA process
or encourage parties to enter into NMSA

negotiations.184
NMSA proponents argue that proclamations over the
continental shelf exceed the bounds of the Antiquities Act,
potentially failing to provide actual protection of the resources if
challenged.' 8 5 Additionally, NMSA proponents believe that the act is
177.
178.
179.

See Brax, supra n. 8, at 82.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 518-519.
Compare Brax, supra n. 8, at 123-129 with Briggett, supra n. 8, at

420.
180. Supra pt. II.A.3.
181. Brax, supra n. 8, at 125.
182. Id. at 127.
183. The NMSA authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to designate
national marine sanctuaries. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1432-1433. Before designation, the
Secretary of Commerce must consider a number of enumerated factors and consult
with Congress, other federal agencies, local officials, and interested citizens. 16
U.S.C. § 1433(a)(2). The Secretary of Commerce then issues a notice of the
proposal in the Federal Register and to the affected communities; Congress
receives detailed documentation. 16 U.S.C. § 1434(a)(1)-(2). After thirty days,
the Secretary of Commerce must provide a public hearing in the area to be affected
by the designation. Id. at § 1434(a)(3). The proposal is then subject to fishing
regulations by the Regional Fishery Management Council and concerns issued by
the appropriate committees in the Senate and House of Representatives. Id at §
1434(a)(5)-46). At this point, the Secretary of Commerce may submit the notice of
designation with the sanctuaries regulations to Congress and for publication in the
Federal Register, or the Secretary of Commerce may withdraw the designation. Id.
at § 1434(b)(l)-(2). This simplified version of the process for a national marine
sanctuary designation demonstrates its complexity in comparison to a national
monument designation under the Antiquities Act.
184. Brax, supra n. 8, at 123-124.
185. Briggett, supra n. 8, at 414, 422.
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slowly gaining political traction, and, if given time, NMSA can be
utilized to provide meaningful marine protection.186 Even if NMSA
emerges as an effective means for marine protection, it does not
supplant the Antiquities Act.
It is without question that FLPMA, ARPA, and NMSA
provide alternative methods to address many situations in which the
Antiquities Act might be used. 187 However, as the above discussion
demonstrates, these acts are not as expansive or advantageous as the
Antiquities Act.
4. FailedCongressionalAction
The statutes discussed above do not specifically contemplate
repealing or limiting the Antiquities Act. However, there have been
bills introduced seeking such drastic measures, some achieving
limited success. Not surprisingly, the number of bills introduced by
opponents of the Antiquities Act swells after proclamation of a
controversial monument.
Two victories were achieved after
controversial declarations by President F. D. Roosevelt and President
Carter, resulting in limitations on the Act in Wyoming and Alaska.189
Following President Clinton's Grand Staircase-Escalante declaration
in 1996, a number of bills were introduced but ultimately failed.19 0
These bills included provisions for acreage limits, congressional
approval, notice to state governments, NEPA compliance, or a
combination of these limitations.191 Many of these bills suffered an
early death in committee.' 92 The House of Representative actually
passed the National Monument NEPA Compliance Act, a bill

186. Id. at 419-420.
187. These acts, however, do not provide provisions allowing monuments
on private land. Infra pt. 1II.B.1-3.
188. See Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 701-702.
189. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 81, 93.
190. Id.
191. Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 723-728.
192. Id.

2011]

THE ANTIQUITIES ACT

175

suggesting limited reform.193 However, the bill stalled in the Senate,
ultimately failing.' 94
Congressional reluctance to amend the Antiquities Act, even
with President Clinton facing a disapproving Republican majority,' 95
may demonstrate a degree of congressional acquiescence to the broad
authority utilized by presidents over the life of the Act.196 Congress'
slow reaction may be because the Property Clause checks the
president's power, allowing Congress to alter proclamations as
necessary.197 Nevertheless, the longer Congress waits to take action,
the further presidents may extend the power, increasing the
likelihood that future legislation will be vetoed.19 8
Congress has awarded two states, Wyoming and Alaska,
small victories against the Antiquities Act.' 99 In reaction to President
Franklin Roosevelt's controversial declaration of the Jackson Hole
monument in Wyoming, Congress amended the Antiquities Act200 to
201
require congressional approval of monuments in Wyoming.
Likewise, following President Carter's declaration of fifteen
monuments totaling fifty-six million acres in Alaska,2 02 Congress
passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act,
requiring congressional approval for monuments greater than five
thousand acres.20 3 While these acts demonstrate that Congress may
193. Id. The bill required the president to solicit public comment and
consult with state governments prior to designations. H.R. 1487, 106th Cong.
(1999). The bill also subjected national monument management plans to NEPA.
Id. The bill was introduced by Representative James V. Hansen of Utah and cosponsored by representatives from Colorado, Montana, California, and Alaska. Id
194. Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 726.
195. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 508.
196. But see Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 702 (arguing the "overall
congressional consensus is that the Act must be rectified" but requires "proper and
acceptable legislation").
197. See Squillace, supra n. 7, at 553-554.
198. See Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 723 (noting that " [w]hether or not he
intends to use the Antiquities Act during his term, any president would
undoubtedly not look favorably upon legislation limiting his own discretionary
power."); Squillace, supra n. 7, at 564.
199. Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 688-689.
200. 16 U.S.C. § 431a.
201. Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 688.
202. Id. at 686-687.
203. Id at 688.
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support some limitation of the Antiquities Act, Congress has been
unable to muster support for comprehensive amendment or repeal of
the Act. Ultimately, however, Congress holds the power to repeal the
Antiquities Act.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
The Antiquities Act has a long history as a controversial
executive power. However, the success of the Antiquities Act in
promoting the conservation and preservation of America's historical
and scientific sites cannot be questioned.20 4 Considering the Act's
controversies and advantages discussed above, the following section
contemplates future uses of the Antiquities Act.
A. Permanence of the Act
Although the Antiquities Act has a tendency to generate
controversy, history indicates that the Act is not in serious jeopardy
of repeal or significant amendment. 205 The Antiquities Act has been
utilized for over a century by presidents of varied political beliefs.2 06
If future presidents view the statutory authority favorably, continued
preservation of the Act should not be in peril. Considering the
president's veto power, it is likely that any limitation or repeal of
presidential authority will require a supermajority vote of
Congress.2 0 7
While such vast opposition is imaginable, the
Antiquities Act has already survived multiple waves of legislative
action, remaining virtually unscathed.2U8
While a highly
controversial presidential action would have the greatest chance of
triggering amendment or repeal of the Act, the Act's over-arching

204. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 7 ("In shaping public policy to
protect a broad array of cultural and natural resources, the impact of the Antiquities
Act is unsurpassed.").
205. Supra pt. II.B.4
206. Supra pt. I.C.
207. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
208. Supra pt. II.
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purpose of preservation and conservation makes it an unlikely target
for a veto override. 20 9
The judicial threat to the Antiquities Act is even less
menacing. Courts already have significantly limited review of
proclamations and may face even greater limitations in the future.210
Even a major controversy provides no additional help for future
Antiquities Act challenges unless the Supreme Court shifts its stance
-211
on judicial review of executive statutory authority.
The Antiquities Act continues to thrive in the wake of
legislative and judicial challenges.2 12 Accordingly, the Act's future
survival rests largely in the hands of the president. Poor drafting of
proclamations may lead to invalidation of certain monument
designations by the courts, and foolish or controversial usage may
lead to amendment or repeal by Congress.
B. Extending the Scope of the Act
Barring controversy, the Antiquities Act can be utilized in a
more expansive way without endangering the preservation of the Act.
The following section will examine two specific approaches to
expanding the Act's scope: 1) separating the declaration and
reservation powers and 2) defining the term "controlled lands."
1. Two Powers - Declarationand Reservation
The plain language of the Antiquities Act suggests that the
Act grants two powers to the president: the power to declare and the
213
As explained below, separating the powers can
power to reserve.
provide greater latitude in future national monument designations.
The Act specifically states: "The President of the United
States is authorized, in his discretion, to declare . . . national
209. Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 723 ("noting that [w]hether or not he intends
to use the Antiquities Act during his term, any president would undoubtedly not
look favorably upon legislation limiting his own discretionary power. ").
210. Suprapt. I.A.1.
211. Id.
212. Supra pt. II.
213. See Squillace, supra n. 7, at 514 (noting that reservations are not
required by the plain language).
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monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land."2 14
The declaration power authorizes the president to declare landmarks,
structures, and objects as national monuments. 215 In effect, the
declaration power itself attaches the national monument title to the
specific landmark, structure, or object and provides an opportunity to
invoke the reservation power.216

The reservation power allows a

president to reserve lands necessary for the protection and
management of national monuments. 2 17 Without the reservation
power, the object or site only obtains a title. Thus, while the
declaration power establishes the monument, the reservation power,
if exercised, allows presidents to provide greater protection for the
monument through the classification of surrounding land as part of
the monument. Although the powers are not explicitly recognized as
distinct, national monument proclamations and a Supreme Court
opinion provide room for the interpretation of separate powers under
the Antiquities Act.
Presidents implicitly acknowledge the separation of these
powers in monument proclamations. Proclamations often begin with
a description of the interests in the national monument before
reserving the land.2 18 In some instances, the description will refer to
214. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (emphasis added).
215. See id ("The President of the United States is authorized, in his
discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are
situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United
States to be national monuments . ... ).

216. The declaration power does not necessarily invoke the reservation
power, but the reservation power may only be exercised after the declaration
power. See id.
217. See id. ("[A]nd may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the
limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with
the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.").
218. See e.g., Exec. Procl. 8335, 74 Fed. Reg. 1557 (Jan. 6, 2009)
(establishing Marianas Trench Marine National Monument); Exec. Procl. 7984, 71
Fed. Reg. 10793 (Feb. 27, 2006) (establishing African Burial Ground National
Monument); Exec. Procl. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50223 (Sept. 18, 1996) (establishing
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument); Exec. Procl. 3889, 83 Stat. 924,
925 (Jan. 20, 1969) (establishing Marble Canyon National Monument); Exec.
Procl. 2027, 47 Stat. 2554 (Feb. 11, 1933) (establishing Death Valley National
Monument).
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the object or land as a monument before the direct reservation.219
These proclamations prominently demonstrate the reservation
power's dependence on the declaration power. Of course, presidents
could cut these proclamations short, creating a national monument
without reserving any land.
On the other hand, there is evidence that the two powers are
not separate. Recent reservation sections of proclamations recite the
Act's language without the permissive "may" in the reservation
clause. 220 This shift in language is likely an attempt to avoid
challenge to the action. First, a president will not explicitly point to
the discretionary aspect of his or her power when exercising it
because this signals to opponents that the action may not be
necessary, thus inviting challenges. Second, likely due to the
controversy surrounding the Act, presidents have begun to alter
proclamations in hopes of limiting the controversy. 22
Further,
presidential proclamations have always utilized the reservation power
together with the declaration power, suggesting that the powers are
inseparable. 222 Historical failure to separate the powers, however,
does not negate the possibility that the powers could be used
separately.
The Supreme Court has provided minimal illumination on the
reservation power. In United States v. California, the Court briefly
described the Antiquities Act power and hinted at the meaning of

219. See e.g., Exec. Procl. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50223 (Sept. 18, 1996)
(establishing the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument).
220. See id.; Exec. Procl. 7984, 71 Fed. Reg. 10793 (Feb. 27, 2006)
(establishing African Burial Ground National Monument).
221. Compare Exec. Procl. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50223 (excluding "may" in
the summation of the Antiquities Act) with Exec. Procl. 3889, 83 Stat. 924, 925
(including "may" in a direct quote of the Antiquities Act). Commentators have
also noted the increased precision and length of Antiquities Act proclamations.
Squillace, supra n. 7, at 542-544.
222. See e.g., Exec. Procl. 8335, 74 Fed. Reg. 1557 (establishing Marianas
Trench Marine National Monument); Exec. Procl. 7984, 71 Fed. Reg. 10793
(establishing African Burial Ground National Monument); Exec. Procl. 6920, 61
Fed. Reg. 50223 (establishing Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument);
Exec. Procl. 3889, 83 Stat. 924, 925 (establishing Marble Canyon National
Monument); Exec. Procl. 2027, 47 Stat. 2554 (establishing Death Valley National
Monument).
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reservation in the context of the Act.223 Although not directly stating
that the two powers are separate, the Court stated that the Act allows
presidents "to create a national monument and reserve land for its
use."224 Just as presidents have departed from the Act's language in
recent proclamations, the Court also departed from the specific
language by using "and" instead of the more permissive "and may"
found in the Act itself. While the Act itself is more suggestive of a
dual power, the Court in Californiadid not foreclose the possibility
that the Act provides two separate powers to the president.
Arguably, the Court's brief discussion of the Antiquities Act
suggests that there is not a dual power because the opinion further
explained the term "reservation" without mentioning the term
"declaration." 225 However, California involved the reservation
power of the Act, not the declaration power.226 Therefore, the Act
and, to a lesser extent, the Court do not impose a reservation as a
requirement for the creation of a national monument.
The California Court also briefly discussed reservations, but
227
The Court clearly
the Court wavered in formulating a definition.
stated that the reservation "cannot . . . escalate the underlying claim

of the United States to the land in question." 228 Beyond this explicit
characterization of the reservation power, the Court provided little
certainty in its explanation. A perplexing "perhaps" accompanies
additional clarification of the term; 2 29 the Court suggested that
reservations are simply a shift in federal land use or federal managing
agency.230

Furthermore,

the

Court

supported

its

uncertain

explanation of "reservation" with a memorandum issued by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to the National Park System
that contained nothing more than the BLM's instruction for
Because the Court's
expanding one particular monument.231
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

U.S. v. Cal., 436 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1978).
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 32-36.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 41.
Cal., 436 U.S. at 40.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40 n. 17.
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explanation of reservations under the Act lacked sufficient support
and conviction, the Act's language cannot possibly preclude
reasonable, alternative interpretations of the term. Thus, by invoking
the plain language, a president could arguably separate the
declaration and reservation powers of the Antiquities Act.
Why would a president choose to declare a national
monument without reserving land to assist with "proper care and
management of the object?" In some instances, a president may
believe that current land use restrictions on the land are already
sufficient to properly care and manage the monument. Declaring a
national monument without invoking the reservation power would
allow private citizens or local government entities to manage a
monument. 232
If significant protections are already in place,
providing a name designation could enhance the status of an object or
landmark without alerting the Act's most dangerous adversary:
public controversy.
2. Defining "ControlledLands"
In addition to separating the proclamation and reservation
powers provided by the Antiquities Act, a president could extend the
scope of the Act by adopting a broad reading of the term "controlled
lands." Neither courts nor commentators have fully explored the
issue, even though the Act states a president cannot issue a
proclamation unless the landmark, structure, or object is located on
"lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United
States." 233 The issue of controlled lands has only truly been
questioned when monuments include submerged lands. 234
Nonetheless, a broad definition of control would drastically increase

232. The Act clearly states that monuments may be declared on controlled
lands. 16 U.S.C. § 431. If other parties also have control of the land, nothing
suggests that the party must provide complete control to the government. In fact,
the opposite is true. The Act provides that the party may, as necessary, relinquish
control of the tract, in whole or in part, to the government. Id. However,
relinquishment of private land by private parties frequently occurs. The Antiquities
Act, supra n. 10, at 32.
233. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (emphasis added).
234. Briggett, supra n. 8, at 411-416.
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the scope of the Act, protecting additional objects that might
otherwise be endangered or destroyed.
The legislative history of the Antiquities Act provides few
clues of the congressional intent for the phrase "lands owned or
controlled." 235 It is known that Hewett inserted the language to
ensure that lands beyond those that were unappropriated would be
covered under the Act. 236 Congress did, however, believe the Act's
scope extended to private land.2 37
The plain language supports a broad reading of the term. 23 8
First, if Congress did not want the Antiquities Act to include private
lands, the language, "or controlled by," would not have been
included. There is further evidence of the inclusion of private land in
the second sentence of the Act, which anticipates the Act's
interaction with private interests.2 3 9 The second sentence of the Act
specifically contemplates the location of a national monument or the
management zone on tracts of land under private ownership or
subject to a private claim.240 When these situations arise, the private
party retains discretion to relinquish control to the government. 24 1 In
235. Supra pt. .A.
236. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 41.
237. Supra pt. I.A.
238. Squillace, supra n. 7, at 486. Courts have deferred to the plain
language of the Act to resolve other disputes. James R. Rasband, Utah's Grand
Staircase: The Right Path to Wilderness Preservation?, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 483,
501-502(1999).
239. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 ("When such objects are situated upon a tract
covered by a bona fide unperfected claim or held in private ownership, the tract, or
so much thereof as may be necessary for the proper care and management of the
object, may be relinquished to the Government, and the Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to accept the relinquishment of such tracts in behalf of the Government
of the United States.").
240. Id. The Act specifically notes a "bona fide unperfected claim." Id.
However, this analysis will focus on all claims due to the fact that if the claim were
perfected, the claim would likely be subject to the Act under the term "private
ownership." See Cameron, 252 U.S. at 456 (discussing valid mineral claims on
national monuments). Arguably, a "bona fide unperfected claim" is neither owned
nor controlled by the United States. Id. Congress likely included the language
beyond private ownership to ensure a "bona fide unperfected claim" would not
escape the scope of Act. Id.
241. 16U.S.C.§431.
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situations where private actors have discretion over control or
ownership, there is less danger in reading the "controlled land"
broadly. Private actors, however, may not always have such
discretion.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cappaert v. United StateS242
helps to demonstrate the possible extent of "controlled lands;"
however, the Court did not specifically analyzing the language of the
Act. Years after President Truman's Devils Hole Proclamation, the
United States sought an injunction against Cappaert's groundwater
pumping on their ranch.24 3 The United States argued that pumping
lowered the water level in Devils Hole, endangering the only known
habitat for Devils Hole pupfish.24 4
The Court affirmed the
injunction, ruling "[w]hen the Federal Government reserves land
from the public domain, by implication it reserves water rights
sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the reservation and that here,
the 1952 Proclamation expressed an intention to reserve
unappropriated water." 245 Although the Court does not specifically
examine the relevant language of the Antiquities Act to reach the
conclusion, Cappaert demonstrates how a national monument may
reach beyond the public domain, 246 analogous to congressional
authority under the Property Clause. 247
The limits of "controlled lands" under the Antiquities Act
remain undefined. The definition could certainly be stretched to
reach beyond public lands, even without permission of owners.
Future presidential proclamations should account for this ambiguity
to ensure protection of precious land or objects.
242. Cappaert,426 U.S. at 128.
243. Id. at 131-134.
244. Id. at 132-134.
245. Id. at 129.
246. Proclamations on federal land are constitutional under the Property
Clause. Supra pt. II.A.2. Proclamations beyond federal land could be authorized
under the Commerce Clause. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559 (1995)
("Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities ...
that substantially affect interstate commerce."). National monuments substantially
affect interstate commerce. See Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 711-712 (discussing the
effect of increased tourism).
247. See Block, 660 F.2d at 1249 ("Under this authority to protect public
land, Congress' power must extend to regulation of conduct on or off the public
land that would threaten the designated purpose of federal lands.").
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C. Utilizing an Extended Scope
Because portions of the Antiquities Act remain largely
unexplored by courts and scholars, this part describes two methods
presidents can take to extend the scope of the Act: 1) the slidingscale test and 2) the negotiate-proclaim method.
1. Sliding-Scale Test
To determine the scope of "controlled lands" under the
Antiquities Act, a sliding-scale test could determine if land or objects
are subject to the proclamation or reservation powers of the Act. 248
This sliding-scale test first requires a determination of the size of the
object, landmark, or structure. As the size of the object increases, the
amount of federal control required for national monument status also
increases. At the extreme, smaller objects, such as pottery, would
require a small degree of federal control while a vast landscape with
varying characteristics would require virtually complete federal
control. In between these extremes, the standards of measurement
would be less precise, potentially leading to controversial national
monuments. Thus, without ownership or control under the slidingscale test, a president could not make a proclamation or reservation
under the Antiquities Act.
The main advantage of utilizing the sliding-scale test for
controlled land is that it enlarges the scope of the Antiquities Act,
protecting more historic and scientific objects at risk of being lost
forever. This advantage is in line with the purpose of the Act.249
Additionally, it could be argued that the sliding-scale test contradicts
the legislative history of the Act to a lesser degree than its
contemporary usage.
Foremost, Congress believed that the
Antiquities Act could protect small, important objects on private
248. A sliding-scale test has been used to determine personal jurisdiction
for websites. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119
(W.D. Pa. 1997). The test examines the interactivity of a website: as interactivity
increases, the likelihood that the website will be subject to personal jurisdiction
also increases. Id. at 1124.
249. Supra pt. I.A.
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land.250 A sliding-scale test would allow this end without trampling
on private property rights. Furthermore, the sliding-scale test would
allow for small tracts or small relics to be protected without locking
up large tracts of federal land. The reservations could also be
temporary but only to the point of ensuring proper recovery.251
Utilizing the sliding-scale test on portions of private lands
raises other concerns. Because large tracts would require nearly
complete federal control, Congress, as the ultimate authority on
public land, could wield its power under the Property Clause to
alleviate any concern about the legitimacy or size of a monument.
Smaller proclamations and reservations on private land under federal
control, however, may be able to evade the legislative check on the
power. The Constitution provides different recourse - the Takings
Clause. The Fifth Amendment states that the government cannot
take "private property . . . for public use, without just
compensation."252 As the term "public use" has been interpreted
broadly, national monuments likely fall within the scope of eminent
domain. 25 3 Of course, declarations and reservations on private land,
even with just compensation, would likely generate controversy. 254
To minimize public controversy, the scales of the sliding test
could differ between the declaration and reservation power. A lower
threshold of control would be required for the declaration power, but
a higher threshold of control would be required for the reservation
power.
Merely declaring a national monument on federally
controlled land stirs up less controversy because the designation

250. Steven Platzman, Objects of Controversy: The Native American Right
to Repatriation,41 Am. U. L. Rev. 517, 537 n. 114 (1992) (citing H.R. Rpt. No.
2224, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1906)).
251. Hewett recognized that some monuments would only need to be
temporary. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 45.
252. U.S. Const. amend. V.
253. See Kelo v. City ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469, 478-480 (2005).
254. See Ilya Somin, The Politics of Economic Development Takings, 58
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1185, 1190-1192 (2008) (detailing the "unprecedented
political backlash" on eminent domain caused by Kelo). National monuments are
not to be created for the purpose of economic development. See 16 U.S.C. § 431.
Conversely, national monuments may be controversial for economic repression.
See Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 706-707 (finding the Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument cost Utah jobs and mining royalties).
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comes with little negative impact. 255 Although a declaration without
resevaton
ome imi on256
a reservation places some
limit on land use,
utilization of the
reservation power would be more restrictive of private land use. A
reservation of controlled land under the Antiquities Act establishes
additional land as a part of the national monument. 257 The amount of
land affected is quite significant because the management plans
contained in national monument proclamations tend to govern the
whole monument, not just the declared object or landmark. 258 Of
course, presidents need not protect the land reserved under the
reservation power to the same degree as the object, structure, or
landmark reserved under the declaration power.259
The sliding-scale test may provide opponents with the
argument that the Antiquities Act allows governmental interference
with private property.
2. The Negotiate-ProclaimStrategy
Another potential extension of Antiquities Act power is the
negotiate-proclaim strategy. 260 This strategy utilizes the separation
255. See Squillace, supra n. 7, at 582 (discussing public support for
national monument designations).
256. Penalties for appropriating, excavating, injuring, or destroying
national monuments apply even in a situation where the president has not utilized
the reservation power. 16 U.S.C. § 433.
257. 16 U.S.C. § 431.
258. See e.g., Exec. Procl. 8335, 74 Fed. Reg. 1557 (establishing Marianas
Trench Marine National Monument); Exec. Procl. 7984, 71 Fed. Reg. 10793
(establishing African Burial Ground National Monument); Exec. Procl. 6920, 61
Fed. Reg. 50223 (establishing Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument).
259. Although the size of the reservation is limited by "the proper care and
management of the objects to be protected," the Act does not state the care must be
equal at all points of the national monument. See 16 U.S.C. § 431. Land that may
be required for "the proper care and management of the objects to be protected"
may require different degrees of protection. Id. Therefore, a president may reserve
land but provide less protection for some of the land depending on the proximity to
the protected object. Adopting this strategy would limit interference with private
land use.
260. The phrase is the creation of the author. It is inspired by the "no
surprises" policy of Bruce Babbitt, President Clinton's Interior Secretary, leading
to perhaps the greatest use of the Act by a president. The Antiquities Act, supra n.
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of the Act's two powers in tandem with the ambiguity of the term
"controlled lands." The strategy encourages the president to use the
broad power of the Act and the ambiguous term as a bargaining chip
in the negotiation process with private parties. The ultimate goal of
the strategy is to obtain access for monument management or to
ensure the private owner will provide proper management of the
monument.26 1
The process would begin with a potential site. While a
private owner could alert a president to a potential national
monument, a president may also seek out national monuments.
Then, the president would alert the private owner of his or her intent
to declare a national monument. 262 Initially, the president's personal
contact would discuss the importance of the object or site, laying the
foundation for cordial negotiations. The president would then assign
a negotiation team to meet with the private owner. For objects on
land owned and completely controlled by a private party, the
presidential negotiation team would have to persuade the owner to
relinquish control, or a declaration could not be made. For objects on
land with a degree of federal control, the negotiation team would
state its case, holding the Antiquities Act as a trump card -

the

declaration and reservation could be made regardless of cooperation
under the broad authority of the Antiquities Act. After successful
negotiations, the president may proclaim the new national monument.
In either case, the negotiation team could utilize the land
exchange program, exchanging private or state land for federal land.
In prior settlements of Antiquities Act controversies with states, the

10, at 11-1 25.Of course, the strategy proposed in this article advocates the use of
negotiation to extend the scope of the Act to private land.
261. The terms "negotiate" and "proclaim" are interchangeable. The
president may either proclaim and then negotiate or negotiate and then proclaim.
For the sake of conserving judicial resources and not overbearing private parties,
the negotiate-proclaim strategy is preferred. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 132-134
(disputing the 1952 proclamation from 1970-1976). Also, the president can only
proclaim monuments on "lands owned or controlled," not wholly private lands. 16
U.S.C. § 431. Therefore, the proclaim-negotiate strategy cannot be utilized when
the object is situated on land where the United States cannot claim control.
262. Advance notice does not hinder monument proclamations. The
Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 143-44.
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federal government has turned to the land exchange program.263
Another option would be to allow for private management of national
monuments. The Antiquities Act does not require the government to
provide proper care and management. 264 Without a doubt, many
private owners would take pride in "their" national monument. 265
And those who would not care for the designation could refuse,
participate in a land exchange, or demand other "just compensation."
A significant advantage of adopting this strategy is the ability
to minimize public controversy through negotiation. Controversy
often leads to rallying cries by Antiquities Act opponents to amend or
repeal the Act. 266 Furthermore, the negotiate-proclaim strategy
would not allow presidents to completely bypass engaging interested
parties. Instead, at least a portion of the American public, a private
party, would be involved. Therefore, the negotiate-proclaim strategy
provides numerous advantages in addition to expanding the
protection of American antiquities.
D. Future'Revisionsof the Antiquities Act
The Antiquities Act could further benefit from a definition
section. A handful of questionable, undefined terms in the Act have
been used to extend the scope of the Antiquities Act. A definition
section could preserve the traditional scope of the Act while
imposing limits that would appease opponents of the Act.
263. Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 700-701; Squillace, supra n. 7, at 511-512.
After declaration of the Grand Staircase-Escalante Monument, Utah retained title to
lands designated for use as school lands but now located within the boundaries of
the national monument. Rusnak, supra n. 13, at 700-701. Utah successfully
convinced Congress to allow the state to trade the land for other federal lands not
located within the national monument. Id.
264. See 16 U.S.C. § 431. The Act provides that the private party may
relinquish the tract to the government when the object is on private land.
265. Presidents must be careful not to water-down the "national
monument" designation. See Supra pt. II.B.l.
266. The controversial use of the Act by President Franklin D. Roosevelt
to declare Jackson Hole a national monument led to legislation prohibiting the
Act's use in Wyoming. The Antiquities Act, supra n. 10, at 81. Following
President Carter's designation of Alaskan national monuments, the Act was
amended to limit the use of the Act in Alaska. Id. at 93.

2011]

THE ANTIQUITIES ACT

189

To provide a greater limitation to the definitional objects
above, Congress could attempt to formulate a limiting definition of
"historic or scientific interest." However, this seems a difficult task
considering that any serious limitation could place fragile resources
at risk. Instead of a specific definition, Congress could impose postproclamation review by a respected historical or scientific body to
ensure a consensus of "historic or scientific interest." The proposed
national monument could also be granted full protection pending the
review process. This review mechanism would place a meaningful
counterweight on the president's vast authority.
As noted above, much of the controversy associated with the
Act relates to proclamations or reservations of private land through
broad use of the phrase "controlled land." Congress could resolve
the problem in a definition section. Taking a cue from the second
sentence of the Act, 267 controlled land could include: 1) land with
severed surface and mineral rights which either claim unperfected by
a private party or government title to either surface or mineral rights,
or 2) the voluntary relinquishment of private property to the
government by instrument, such as an easement or any other right
less than complete ownership. Of course, Congress could make the
definition broader, including a sliding-scale test, or narrower, such as
a limitation to public land only. A clear definition of "controlled
land" would significantly reduce the Antiquities Act's ambiguity, but
Congress must ensure the over-arching purpose of the Act remains
undisturbed.
Throughout the Act's history, from debate to recent
proclamations, the size of the national monument has been a point of
contention. Congress could further limit this controversy by defining
the phrase "smallest area compatible." Congress could utilize a
variety of definitional approaches to limit the size of national
monuments.
For example, the definition of "smallest area
267. The second sentence of the Antiquities Act states: "When such
objects are situated upon a tract covered by a bona fide unperfected claim or held in
private ownership, the tract, or so much thereof as may be necessary for the proper
care and management of the object, may be relinquished to the Government, and
the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to accept the relinquishment of such
tracts in behalf of the Government of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 431. The Act
clearly distinguishes perfected mineral claims from unperfected mineral claims and
contemplates private relinquishment of land.
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compatible" could be linked with the definitions of "landmarks,"
"structures," and "objects." Alternatively, the Act could be amended
to require approval of large national monuments above an acreage
threshold, either by Congress or an independent review body, as
suggested above for determinations regarding "historic or scientific
interest." Before taking action, however, Congress should consider
the Antiquities Act contribution to preservation and conservation that
has extended for over a century. 268
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Antiquities Act has a rich historical tradition of
preservation and conservation, the outer limits of the Act remain
unknown. Accordingly, presidents should continue to slowly push
the boundaries of the Act in order to conserve America's historic and
scientific landmarks and surrounding landscapes. These conservation
goals could be accomplished in several ways. First, by separating the
Act's declaration and reservation powers and reading the term
"controlled" broadly, the president will have more latitude in making
monument designations.
Second, although the Act has been
historically used to protect large tracts of public land, the Act may
also be increasingly used to protect smaller objects and smaller tracts
on private land, perhaps even allowing private or state management
of national monuments. Finally, the president could expand the
scope of the act by using the sliding-scale test or the negotiateproclaim strategy. Because it provides for more public input, the
negotiate-proclaim strategy is preferred. However, using the slidingscale test in unison with the strategy could provide greater protection
to these potential monuments. The Antiquities Act will continue to
raise public controversy, but a proper and limited expansion of the

268. Depending on the political climate and size of the controversy,
Congress could also look to previously failed bills for amendment guidance. There
are many other potential reforms, including: limiting the size of monuments,
requiring congressional approval, providing notice to state governments, requiring
NEPA compliance, or combining of one or more of these limitations. See Rusnak,
supra n. 13, at 723-728.
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Act will provide vital protection for America's important historical
objects, structures, and landmarks.

